8010 Dumps with Practice Exam Questions Answers

In the univariate Gaussian model, each risk factor is modeled separately independent of the others, and the dependence between the risk factors is captured by the covariance matrix (or its equivalent combination of the correlation matrix and the variance matrix). Risk factors could include interest rates of different tenors, different equity market levels etc.

While this is a simple enough model, it has a number of limitations.

First, it fails to fit to the empirical distributions of risk factors, notably their fat tails and skewness. Second, a single covariance matrix is insufficient to describe the fine codependence structure among risk factors as non-linear dependencies or tailcorrelations are not captured. Third, determining the covariance matrix becomes an extremely difficult task as the number of risk factors increases. The number of covariances increases by the square of the number of variables.

But an inability to capture linear relationships between the factors is not one of the limitations of the univariate Gaussian approach - in fact it is able to do that quite nicely with covariances.

A way to address these limitations is to consider joint distributions of the risk factors that capture the dynamic relationships between the risk factors, and that correlation is not a static number across an entire range of outcomes, but the risk factors can behave differently with each other at different intersection points.

The persistence parameter, λ, is the coefficient of the prior day's variance in EWMA calculations. A higher value of the persistence parameter tends to 'persist' the prior value of variance for longer. Consider an extreme example - if the persistence parameter is equal to 1, the variance under EWMA will never change in response to returns.

1 - λ is the coefficient of recent market returns. As λ is lowered, 1 - λ increases,giving a greater weight to recent market returns or shocks. Therefore, as λ is lowered, the model will react faster to market shocks and give higher weights to recent returns, and at the same time reduce the weight on prior variance which will tend to persist for a shorter period.

Statement I is correct. Retail Risk Based Pricing (RRBP) involves the use of borrower specific data (such as FICO scores, average balances etc) to arrive at credit decisions. These 'retail' credit decisions may include decisions on whether to grant a line of credit, a mortgage, issue a credit card, or any of the various other retail activities abank may be dealing with. At the same time, this data can also be used to price the product, in addition to providing a yes or no credit decision so that risky borrowers are charged more than less risky borrowers.

Statement II is not correct, because an integrated Risk Information Management Environment includes three elements - people, processes and technology (and not just people and processes).

Statement III is correct. An LDM is a blue print of an organization's data, and describes the relationships between the various data elements.

Statement IV is not correct because reference data and metadata are not the same thing. Reference data refers to relatively static data, such as customer name (while actual transactions may not be so static). Metadata refers to data about data, and is stored in a data dictionary.

Therefore Choice 'b' is the correct answer and the rest are incorrect.

A recap would be in order here: calculating operational risk capital is a multi-step process.

First, we fit curves to estimate the parameters to our chosen distribution types for frequency (eg, Poisson), and severity (eg, lognormal). Note that these curves are fitted at the UoM level - which is the lowest level of granularity at which modeling is carried out. Since there are many UoMs, there are are many frequency and severity distributions. However what we are interested in is the loss distribution for the entire bank from which the 99.9th percentile loss can be calculated. From the multiple frequency and severity distributions we have calculated, this becomes a two step process:

- Step 1: Calculate the aggregate loss distribution for each UoM. Each loss distribution is based upon and underlying frequency and severity distribution.

- Step 2: Combine the multiple loss distributions after considering the dependence between the different UoMs. The 'dependence' recognizes that the various UoMs are not completely independent, ie the loss distributions are not additive, and that there is a sort of diversification benefit in the sense that not all types of losses can occur at onceand the joint probabilities of the different losses make the sum less than the sum of the parts.

Step 1 requires simulating a number, say n, of the number of losses that occur in a given year from a frequency distribution. Then n losses are picked from theseverity distribution, and the total loss for the year is a summation of these losses. This becomes one data point. This process of simulating the number of losses and then identifying that number of losses is carried out a large number of times to get the aggregate loss distribution for a UoM.

Step 2 requires taking the different loss distributions from Step 1 and combining them considering the dependence between the events. The correlations between the losses are described by a 'copula', andcombined together mathematically to get a single loss distribution for the entire bank. This allows the 99.9th percentile loss to be calculated.

According to a paper by the BCBS, here is an excellent summary of what happened. Based on this, Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

"At the outset of the crisis, mortgage default shocks played a part in the deterioration of marketprices of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). Simultaneously, these shocks revealed deficiencies in the models used to manage and price these products. The complexity and resulting lack of transparency led to uncertainty about the value of the underlying investment. Market participants then drastically scaled down their activity in the origination and distribution markets and liquidity disappeared. The standstill in the securitisation markets forced banks to warehouse loans that were intended to be soldin the secondary markets. Given a lack of transparency of the ultimate ownership of troubled investments, funding liquidity concerns were triggered within the banking sector as banks refused to provide sufficient funds to each other. This in turn led to the hoarding of liquidity, exacerbating further the funding pressures within the banking sector. The initial difficulties in subprime mortgages also fed through to a broader range of market instruments since the drying up of market and funding liquidity forced market participants to liquidate those positions which they could trade in order to scale back risk. An increase in risk aversion also led to a general flight to quality, an example of which was the high withdrawals by households from money market funds."